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Kant on de re: some aspects of the 
Kantian non-conceptualism debate 
 
Luca Forgione, University of Basilicata 
 
n recent years non-conceptual content theorists have taken 
Kant as a reference point on account of his notion of 
intuition (§§ 1-2). The present work aims at exploring 
several complementary issues intertwined with the notion of 
non-conceptual content: of these, the first concerns the role of 
the intuition as an indexical representation (§ 3), whereas the 
second applies to the presence of a few epistemic features 
articulated according to the distinction between knowledge by 
acquaintance and knowledge by description (§ 4). This work 
intends to dismiss the possibility that intuition may have an 
autonomous function of de re knowledge in support of an 
interpretative reading which can be labelled as weak concept-
ualism. To this end, the exploration will be conducted from a 
strictly transcendental perspective – i.e., by referring to the so-
called theory of the “concept of a transcendental object”. 
 
1. Kant between Conceptualism and 
Non-Conceptualism: Preliminaries 
 
s is well known, Kant is regarded as the philosopher of 
the conceptualist position, i.e., the perspective holding 
the impossibility to attain knowledge, experience, or 
perception of reality in the absence of conceptual capacities. In 
the last decade, Kant has become a key frame of reference even 
for the theorists of non-conceptual content through a com-
prehensive reflection on the sensible dimension and the relevant 
notion of intuition in particular. 
One of the most influential contemporary theorists of 
Conceptualism is McDowell. In Mind and World, McDowell 
addresses several parts of the Kantian approach to assert a 
I 
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Kantian conceptualist theory of experience and attack any other 
approach based on a non-conceptual content. According to 
recent interventions in the Kantian debate on non-conceptual 
content, Sellars and McDowell have not recognized Kant’s 
fundamental contribution to the non-conceptualist theory, nor 
has the contemporary debate adequately emphasized its own 
debt to Kant, so much so that Hanna (2006, 90-1) has claimed 
that  «Kant’s theory of intuition is the hidden historical origin of 
both sides of the debate between conceptualists and non-
conceptualists». 
The debate on non-conceptual content is split among several, 
not entirely consistent positions. Although it is unquestionably 
difficult to find an agreed upon definition in the current debate, 
Bermúdez’s general considerations (2003, 1) can be taken as a 
starting point. Bermúdez argues that if the content of a mental 
state of a (human or non-human) creature is what the mental 
state actually represents, according to the theory of non-
conceptual mental content certain mental states represent reality 
even if their subject does not possess the necessary concepts to 
articulate their contents. More precisely, while Conceptualism 
holds that the mental states of non-human creatures have no 
mental content due to their lack of conceptual capacities, Non-
Conceptualism regards the representational content as being 
determined not only (or not entirely) by conceptual abilities, but 
also by non-conceptual capacities shared by infants and non-
human creatures (cf. Evans 1982; Bermúdez 2003; Gunther 
2003; Hanna 2008, 2011)1. 
                                                            
1 Along the lines of Gunther (2003) – cf. also Speaks (2005) and Bermúdez (2003) – Hanna 
(2008) outlines seven different arguments used in the debate for Non-Conceptualism: 1) if 
animals and children do not possess concepts, then their perceptual capacity must depend on 
non-conceptual cognition with non-conceptual content; 2) if the perceptual experience has a 
qualitative character based on the so-called phenomenological fineness of grain, which 
cannot be captured by a conceptual articulation, then a part of the human perceptual 
experience is non-conceptual; 3) if a subject can discriminate an item from a perceptual point 
of view, without the strictly conceptual ability to re-identify the item in question, then the 
subject is capable of non-conceptual cognition with non-conceptual content; 4) if it is 
possible to have a perception (or experience) of something without a judgment, then the 
cognition which is not based on judgments is non-conceptual with a non-conceptual content; 
                                                                                               KSO 2015: 
 
Luca Forgione, Kant on de re: some aspects of the Kantian 
non-conceptualism debate, KSO 2015: 32-64. 
Posted May 25, 2015 www.kantstudiesonline.net 
© 2015 Luca Forgione & Kant Studies Online Ltd. 
 
 
34 
Within the non-conceptualist approach, Speaks (2005, 360) 
distinguishes two theses. According to the first – holding an 
absolutely non-conceptual content, and endorsed by Evans 
(1982), Martin (1992), Peacocke (1992), Heck (2000) – a state 
of mind has an absolutely non-conceptual content if and only if 
the type of content of the mental state is different from that of 
beliefs and thoughts. The second argument concerns the 
relationship between subject and content, and asserts a 
relatively non-conceptual content: a subject’s mental state at 
time t has a relatively non-conceptual content if and only if the 
content of the mental state in question includes contents not 
conceptually grasped or held by the subject at time t2. 
Hanna (2008) introduces several Kantian non-conceptualist 
arguments, among which the well-known Two Hands 
Argument. Already expounded in the pre-critical period, the 
argument holds that the incongruent counterparts do not feature 
any descriptive or conceptual difference and can be dis-
tinguished only from a perceptual standpoint. Therefore, while 
Hanna contends that an absolutely non-conceptual content, 
Kantian non-conceptualists have articulated several argument-
ative strategies in the transcendental system to identify a 
                                                                                                                                       
5) if one assumes the distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that (or knowing-what), 
then the capacity to know how to do something without knowing that or knowing what you 
are doing presupposes that the knowing-how is non-conceptual cognition with non-
conceptual content; 6) if one of the assumptions of the theories in concept-acquisition is 
based on the non-conceptual perception of the objects falling under such concepts, then part 
of the perceptual capacity is non-conceptual with non-conceptual content; 7) if the theory of 
demonstratives includes the thesis that demonstrative reference is basically fixed indexically 
– and, on that account, non-descriptively – then perception is non-conceptual with non-
conceptual content. 
2 Within what he terms Absolutist Non-Conceptualism, Hanna (2008) distinguishes a weak 
Absolutist Non-Conceptualism from a strong Absolutist Non-Conceptualism. According to 
the first theory, the structure and function of perceptual mental contents are contingently 
distinct from the structure and function of conceptual content (contingently absolutely non-
conceptual content). According to the second thesis, the structure of perceptual mental 
contents is essentially distinct (essentially absolutely non-conceptual content). What Tye 
(2006) terms the robustly non-conceptual content of a perceptual state – in his view, a 
Russellian rather than Fregean proposition – to Hanna might be related to a contingently 
absolutely non-conceptual content: as Tye himself (2006) remarks, it is not excluded that this 
can be articulated through the conceptual dimension. 
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comparatively non-conceptual content in the intuition (see 
Allais 2009). Within this general framework, the difference 
between non-conceptual cognition and its content and concept-
ual cognition and its content seems to reflect the Kantian 
distinction between concepts and intuitions: the intuitive re-
presentations are assumed to possess certain semantic features 
pertaining to the indexical dimension alongside some epistemic 
features articulated according to the distinction between know-
ledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description (see 
Hanna 2008; de Sá Pereira 2013). The latter will be focused 
upon after the following framing of the types of representations 
in the transcendental system. 
 
2. Concepts and intuitions: the togetherness 
principle and Kantian Non-Conceptualism 
  
n the three classic passages presented below, Kant articu-
lates the difference between the main types of represent-
ations. 
 
All cognitions, that is, all representations related with 
consciousness to an object, are either intuitions or con-
cepts. An intuition is a singular representation (repraesen-
tatio singularis), a concept a universal (repraesentatio per 
notas communes) or reflected representation (repraesen-
tatio discursiva) (Log, 589). 
 
In whatever way and through whatever means a cognition 
may relate to objects, that through which it relates 
immediately to them, and at which all thought as a means 
is directed as an end, is intuition. This, however, takes 
place only insofar as the object is given to us; but this in 
turn, is possible only if it affects the mind in a certain way. 
The capacity (receptivity) to acquire representations 
through the way in which we are affected by objects is 
I 
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called sensibility. Objects are therefore given to us by 
means of sensibility, and it alone affords us intuitions; but 
they are thought through the understanding, and from it 
arise concepts. But all thought, whether straightaway 
(directe) or through a detour (indirecte), must ultimately 
be related to intuitions, thus, in our case, to sensibility, 
since there is no other way in which objects can be give to 
us.  (KrV A19/B33) 
 
The genus is representation in general (repraesentatio). 
Under it stands the representation with consciousness 
(perceptio). A perception that refers to the subject as a 
modification of its state is a sensation (sensatio); an 
objective perception is a cognition (cognitio). The latter is 
either an intuition or a concept (intuitus vel conceptus). 
The former is immediately related to the object and is 
singular; the latter is mediate, by means of a mark, which 
can be common to several things. (KrV A320/B376) 
 
Starting with the mathematical-philosophical debate stirred 
up by Hintikka (1967, 1969, 1972) and Parsons (1969, 1984, 
2012), there have been identified certain conditions to be 
fulfilled in order for a representation to be an intuition. In the 
selected passages above Kant argues that the intuition is a 
singular representation: in other words, he introduces (a) the 
singularity condition based on the type of denotation involved, 
where the intuition is a singular representation denoting an 
individual object, as opposed to the concept, which relates to 
different objects falling under it in view of the presence of the 
very property the concept represents. In the second and third 
passages, where Kant adds that the intuition is «immediately 
related to the object», he virtually spells out (b) the immediacy 
condition, which concerns the type of relationship between the 
representation and its denotation, as opposed to concepts re-
ferring to the object through the mediation of the conceptual 
features or marks composing the very concept’s intension. 
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Although the latter condition has been at the centre of a harsh 
dispute between Hintikka and Parsons3, several commentators 
are inclined to link the immediacy condition with the referential 
directness of the intuition. These scholars contend that intuitive 
representations not only bring about the immediate cognition of 
objects, but also identify them with no mediation of conceptual 
or descriptive contents. In the second passage, Kant (1783, 33) 
also introduces (c) the object dependence condition, i.e., the 
condition of immediacy implying a criterion of object-
dependency whereby intuitions are produced as long as the 
objects are given: «An intuition is a representation of the sort 
which would immediately depend on the presence of an 
object». The intuition is assumed to be a relational form of 
cognition, its objective validity resting on the existence of the 
object. 
                                                            
3 According to Hintikka, singularity and immediacy are not to be regarded as distinct criteria 
in the definition of an intuition: while the former is the only distinctive feature needed to 
define an intuitive representation, the condition of immediacy is a secondary trait arising 
from the criterion of singularity itself. Expressly, singularity is the necessary and sufficient 
condition to define the notion of intuition, the criterion of immediacy – understood as the 
absence of mediation of conceptual marks – being just a mere corollary of singularity. This 
concerns the intuitions’ reference modality based on a specifically immediate or direct 
relationship with their respective objects; on the other hand, the concepts’ characteristics or 
notes are involved in the determination of the reference (Hintikka 1972, 342). It follows that 
the immediacy criterion does not establish a necessary link between intuition and sensibility – 
Hintikka (1965; 1967) points out that in a phase of Kant’s approach the intuitive 
representation was not connected to sensibility – nor, a fortiori, can the criterion serve as an 
additional specification for its definition: understood as a mere corollary of singularity, it does 
not presuppose the presence of any object (Hintikka 1972, 341). On account of his different 
approach to the Kantian philosophy of mathematics, Parsons rejects the primacy Hintikka 
assigns to the singularity criterion in the definition of the intuition: the condition of 
immediacy – considered by the author as an essentially phenomenological-perceptual 
epistemic criterion – is not so much a dark formula nor a corollary of the singularity 
condition but rather the criterion to identify intuitive representations, which also implies that 
the object to which the intuition refers is somehow directly present to the mind and 
perception. To Parsons, singularity is a necessary but not sufficient condition, too large a 
criterion to encompass the notion of intuition: in fact, there can be singular representations 
which are not immediate, such as those linguistically expressed by definite descriptions; for 
this reason, he introduces the immediacy criterion as a separate condition from singularity. 
Ultimately, while to Hintikka the intuition is immediate for the very reason that it is singular, 
to Parsons it is singular and immediately linked to its object. 
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This basically demonstrative relation implies (d) the related-
ness to sensibility condition: the intuitive representation has a 
direct reference to the sensible object because this can be given 
only through the faculty of sensibility, i.e., the faculty to receive 
sensible representations based on the way in which the subject 
is affected by the objects: «it comes along with our nature that 
intuition can never be other than sensible, i.e., that it contains 
only the way in which we are affected by objects» (KrV 
A51/B75) (cf. Howell 1973, 209). This amounts to saying that, 
to Kant, it is logically possible for a non-human mind – e.g., the 
divine mind – to have an intellectual intuition (cf. KrV B 72). 
Hanna (2006, 102) points to a further (e) priority-to-thought 
condition, for which the intuition is a representation that can be 
given before thinking. The priority of intuition is both cognitive 
and semantic, its independence and objective validity being 
marked regardless of the conceptual dimension. 
Concepts and intuitions can be both pure and empirical; in 
particular, an empirical intuition is the product of both sensation 
(Empfindung) – the effect produced by an object on the capacity 
of sensible representation, i.e., the matter of sensibility – and 
pure intuitions, namely time and space, i.e., the a priori pure 
forms in which the sensible matter is organized. At the 
empirical level, it seems possible to summarize these conditions 
by arguing that an object is given only through sensibility, 
producing intuitions by virtue of a relation with the object. Such 
a relation depends on the sensations composing the matter of 
the intuition; they are articulated before the intervention of 
thought through the pure forms of sensibility – time and space – 
producing a singular representation immediately linked with the 
object. 
If concepts and intuitions are two distinct types of objective 
representations, from an epistemic point of view they are both 
necessarily involved in the judgment for the determination of 
objective knowledge: with the well-known adage, «Thoughts 
without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are 
blind». The togetherness principle, whereby knowledge is 
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produced only through the joint intervention of concepts and 
intuitions, has been supported by McDowell’s Kant-inspired 
conceptualist position: 
 
Our cognition arises from two fundamental sources in the 
mind, the first of which is the reception of representations 
(the receptivity of impressions), the second the faculty for 
cognizing an object by means of these representations 
(spontaneity of concepts); through the former an object is 
given to us, through the latter it is thought in relation to 
that representation (as a mere determination of the mind). 
Intuition and concepts therefore constitute the elements of 
all our cognition, so that neither concepts without intuition 
corresponding to them in some way nor intuition without 
concepts can yield a cognition. (KrV A50/B74) 
 
Against this view, Hanna argues that concepts and intuitions 
are cognitively and semantically interdependent only as to the 
constitution of objectively valid judgments. Beyond this specific 
epistemic dimension consisting of empirically meaningful 
judgments, empty concepts or blind intuitions are certainly 
possible; Hanna distinguishes a direct relation of the perceptual 
dimension in the Kantian approach: intuitions are represent-
ations cognitively and semantically independent of the concepts 
with non-conceptual cognitive contents (Hanna 2006, 100). 
Against this background, the togetherness principle is 
consistent with Kantian Non-Conceptualism on account of the 
epistemic and metaphysical independence of the intuitive 
representation. From these considerations, there emerge the two 
above-mentioned theoretical issues which are closely linked to 
the notion of non-conceptual content: the first is semantic and 
will be addressed in the next paragraph, whereas the second is 
more closely concerned with epistemic considerations which 
will be analyzed in the fourth paragraph. 
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3. The intuition as an indexical representation 
 
ome of the scholars involved in the current debate on 
Kantian non-conceptual content consider the sensible 
intuition an indexical representation; thus, they are prone 
to link it with directly referential singular terms (Hanna 2000, 
21). This position has already been supported within the 
Kantian philosophical-mathematical debate: regardless of the 
different approaches, both Hintikka and Parsons correlate the 
distinction between concepts and intuitions to that between 
singular and general terms. Moreover, following Hintikka’s 
account, Howell (1973) sees the synthesis of the manifold in the 
intuition as the Kantian version of quantification in the 
perceptual context and suggests a synthesis of the two 
positions4. 
Hanna (2001, 195-6) focuses on the features of the 
immediacy criterion to highlight that only intuitions can 
immediately refer to an object; concepts, on the other hand, are 
provided with a mediated reference based on the conceptual 
                                                            
4 On the one hand, Howell agrees with Hintikka’s Transcendental Aesthetic interpretation 
but (and in line with Parsons) rejects Hintikka’s assumption that all singular representations 
are intuitive. As can be seen from different textual evidence in Kant, certain singular 
representations – such as those corresponding to definite descriptions – depend on the 
mediation of a conceptual mark. As such, they are not purely intuitive. On the other hand, 
while he concurs with Parsons’ contending that the immediacy criterion is no corollary of 
singularity, Howell rejects – like Hintikka – Parsons’ assumption that this criterion should be 
identified with the sensible giveness rather than with the relation without mediation of a 
conceptual mark between the intuition and its object. In conclusion, he considers singular 
intuitions immediate singular representations – a sort of mental demonstratives – and frames 
them within the theory of direct reference. Within a Fregean discussion on the nature of Sinn, 
in referring to a passage where Frege comments on Kant’s notion of intuition in geometry to 
clarify the matter of apprehension of a geometric entity without this being conceptually 
distinguishable from other entities, Burge (1979, 431) also identifies the notion of intuition 
with a strictly non-descriptive indexical representation which will be useful to recall while 
discussing the nature of de re thoughts. Howell and Burge are not the only ones to connect 
the notion of intuition with this theoretical framework: apparently Hintikka himself (1972, 
342) has hinted at a «direct reference to objects» in order to expound the immediacy criterion. 
In his Postscript, Parsons (2012) also emphasizes this point while reporting Hintikka’s 
position during a 1983 discussion (also remarking that it should have led Hintikka to disavow 
his position on the immediacy criterion as a corollary of singularity). 
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marks composing their intension and determining the set of 
objects which fall under them. Hanna redefines the nature of the 
referential mechanism of the intuition in contemporary terms by 
explicitly referring to the theory of direct reference mainly 
developed by Kaplan, Kripke, and Putnam: just as particular 
singular terms (including demonstratives and indexicals proper) 
are directly referential, denoting their object directly – i.e., 
without a mediation or satisfaction of descriptive conditions – 
sensible intuitions are indexical singular representations directly 
relating to their objects, that is, without the mediation of a 
conceptual content: «So the Kantian distinction between 
conceptual (mediate) reference and intuitive (immediate) 
reference is most accurately construed as the difference be-
tween, on the one hand, indirect or description-determined 
reference to an object, and, on the other, direct or non-
description-determined reference to an object. More plainly put, 
intuitional reference is direct reference» (Hanna 2001, 197). 
While it is possible to recognize the same referential device, 
it does not seem just as possible to assert a link between the role 
of the intuition and that of singular terms (Thompson 1972, 
Capozzi, 2014). In this respect, at least two fundamental theo-
retical assumptions are to be isolated in the transcendental 
system: the first regards the logical form of singular judgments, 
the second concerns the dismissal of lowest species. 
 
3.1 The logical form of singular judgments 
 
irstly, the logical form of the judgment does not involve 
any singular representation: to Kant, judgment consti-
tuents are always concepts, namely general represent-
ations. More specifically, these consist of cases of singular 
judgments using a) proper names as subjects, as in Kant’s 
examples «Caius is mortal» (Log, 599; KrV A322/B378) and 
«Adam was fallible» (Reflexion 3080, AA 16, 647); b) 
demonstratives with the form “This F is G”: «this house is 
F 
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plastered in this way or that» (Wiener Logik 1992, 352) and 
«This world is the best» (Reflexion 3173, AA 16, 695); c) 
definite descriptions expressing a concept’s singular use have to 
be contextualized within the traditional logical frame accepted 
by Kant. From the angle of logical form, singular judgments are 
to be treated as universal ones: 
 
The logicians rightly say that in the use of judgments in 
syllogisms singular judgments can be treated like uni-
versal ones. For just because they have no domain at all, 
their predicate is not merely related to some of what is 
contained under the concept of the subject while being 
excluded from another part of it. The predicate therefore 
holds of that concept without exception, just as if the latter 
were a generally valid concept with a domain with the 
predicate applying to the whole of what is signified. (KrV 
A71/B96) 
 
This entails that the subject of a singular judgment can be 
used in an equivalent universal judgement, as in Kant’s 
example «God is without error; everything which is God is 
without error» (Reflexion 3080, AA16, 647). Certainly, from an 
epistemic point of view – but not from that of logical validity – 
if a singular judgment (judicium singular) is compared with a 
universal one (judicia communia) with respect to quantity, the 
two will appear quite different. Indeed, Kant states that the 
former relates to the latter as unity relates to infinity, implying a 
singular use of a concept, as will be observed shortly.  
 
3.2 The dismissal of lowest species  
 
he second assumption concerns the anti-Aristotelian and 
anti-Leibnizian dismissal of lowest species and singular 
concepts. Concepts are considered predicates of 
possible judgments through their application to other concepts; 
T 
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no concept has a singular representative function thoroughly 
determining an individual or particular (cf. A656/B684 for 
explicit support). 
Following Capozzi, it is important to remember that to Kant 
every concept has an intension (Inhalt) and an extension 
(Umfang)5. The inverse connection between intension and 
extension («Quantum cognitio ab una parte lucri facit, tantum 
ab altera mulctatur» – Reflexion 2893, AA16,  564) sets forth a 
relation of subordination specifying the hierarchy among the 
concepts based on genus and species. The possibility to 
articulate the hierarchy of concepts depends on two comple-
mentary operations: abstraction and determination. Abstraction 
is a bottom-up process from lower to higher concepts; as marks 
are subtracted, the complexity of intension decreases. The 
inverse operation is determination, which is similar to addition 
in that it practically adds marks and concepts to higher concepts 
so as to move down through the hierarchy.  
The more marks the abstraction subtracts from the concept’s 
intension, the higher we ascend to the very top of the summum 
genus, i.e., the concept of something (Etwas) (cf. Log, 593; 
Logik Pölitz AA24, 570), of a being (Wesen), or of a thing 
(Ding) (cf. Logik Dohna-Wundlacken 1992, 488). On the 
contrary, and according to the law of specification, there is no 
concept or species infima under which no other conceptual 
content can possibly stand. Determination is virtually unlimited: 
                                                            
5 Both intension and extension fall under the notion of “containment”. While the former 
consists of the set of marks contained by the concept (Logik Pölitz AA24, 569) – a generic 
content to be kept distinct from the logical essence (cf. infra) – «the extension of a concept is 
a sphaera, and it is concerned with the multitude of things that are contained under the 
concept» (Wiener Logik 1992, 354). In particular, «the more the things that stand under a 
concept and can be thought through it, the greater is its extension or sphere» (Log, 593). It is 
necessary to specify that the extension can also consist of a set of concepts (cf. 
Philosophische Enzyklopädie, AA29, 17). Following the Port-Royal tradition (see Capozzi, 
Roncaglia 2009,  99-100; Capozzi, 2009, 127), in the literature there are two definitions of 
“extension”: 1) in the logical doctrine of judgments and inferences, the extension consists of 
the things contained by the concept, also referred to as “extension-class” by Capozzi; 2) in 
the logical doctrine of concepts, Kant speaks of extension logic (Log, 596), whereby the 
extension consists of the concepts in whose intensions the concept is contained (Capozzi, 
2009, 128; Capozzi, 2014). 
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Every genus requires different species, and these sub-
species, and since none of the latter once again is ever 
without a sphere, (a domain as a conceptus communis), 
reason demands in its entire extension that no species be 
regarded as in itself the lowest; for since each species is 
always a concept that contains within itself only what is 
common to different things, this concept cannot be 
thoroughly determined, hence it cannot be related to an 
individual, consequently, it must at every time contain 
other concepts, i.e., subspecies, under itself. This law of 
specification could be expressed thus: entium varietates 
non temere esse minuendas. (KrV A655-6/B683-4) 
 
Although each concept is a species contained in some higher 
genus up to the very top of the summum genus hierarchy, which 
expresses the maximum generality, each concept can be further 
articulated by an even more specific one. Consequently, 
following Log (595) no concept can be not common, free of 
extension and not subject to further determination: 
 
[. . .] in the series of species and genera there is no lowest 
concept (conceptus infimus) or lowest species, under 
which no other would be contained, because such a one 
cannot possibly be determined. For even if we have a 
concept that we apply immediately to individuals, there 
can still be specific differences in regard to it, which we 
either do not note, or which we disregard  
 
All this results in an anti-Leibnizian rejection of the principle 
of indiscernibles, which lies on the assumption that in the 
absence of haecceity – i.e., according to the dictates of the 
Discourse on Metaphysics, the complete notion of an individual 
which defines a set of attributes determining the metaphysical 
identity of the individual substance (monad) – one cannot state 
that two individuals with the same concept are the same. 
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3.3 The conceptualist form of singular terms 
 
t is exactly because the possibility of singular concepts6 is 
rejected that the intuition – a singular representation by 
definition – amounts to the best possible candidate to fill the 
subject role in singular judgments. The principle whereby 
intuitions cannot fill the subject role in singular judgments holds 
together with the denial of an infima species and singular or 
individual concepts: in fact, Kant allows for the possibility of a 
singular use of a concept in the subject role within singular 
judgments. While Kant (Log, 589) explicitly states that con-
cepts are representations whose logical form is always general 
by definition, he also allows for three different uses of concepts, 
namely general, singular and particular: «it is a mere tautology 
to speak of universal or common concepts – a mistake that is 
grounded in an incorrect division of concepts into universal, 
particular, and singular. Concepts themselves cannot be so 
divided, but only their use (Gebrauch)». 
In this regard, one should refer to the Kantian view that no 
thought is non-linguistic, every name referring to the concept’s 
logical essence. This consists of marks being a) necessary or 
constitutive in order to define the concept itself (Wiener Logik 
1992, 293); b) primitive (cf. Letter to Reinhold, May 12 1789, 
[1967, 138]); c) inseparable and immutable, no other concepts 
being possible without them (Logik Dohna-Wundlacken 1992, 
463); d) numerically limited (KrV A728/B756); e) arbitrarily 
associated with the name attributed to the concept (1798, 191); 
                                                            
6 With Capozzi (2009), proper names are associated with conceptus singulares, «as 
disconcerting may be the presence of this term in the Kantian logical lexicon» given Kant’s 
explicit dismissal of singular concepts: being something and being one are the only necessary 
marks to articulate the conceptus singulares. If they cannot differ in content – this obviously 
being the same in all of them – then singular concepts designated by proper names differ only 
in number: «differentia numerica (Caius, Titius)» (Reflexion 2901, AA 16, 566). In a further 
Reflexion (2392, AA16, 34), Kant argues that in the judgment the conceptus singulares 
designated by such names as “Julius Caesar” can fulfil the role of the subject, not that of the 
predicate, given their lack of logical extension. 
I 
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f) subject to logical-linguistic analysis (Logik Dohna-
Wundlacken 1992, 464). If the word “home” designates a 
common concept, this can be used in three different ways based 
on the quantititative determination (universal, particular, or 
singular) of its extension-class, i.e., the set of things which can 
be articulated in toto, in parte, or in individuo (1992, 352). The 
Wiener Logik (1992, 352) expounds the issue as follows: 
 
I can make use of a concept insofar as it is applied to 
many objects[;] then the concept is used as a repraesen-
tatio communis, i.e., is used in abstracto, e.g., house. If I 
say of all houses, now, that they must have a roof, then 
this is the usus universalis. It is always the same concept, 
however, and is here used wholly universally. For having 
a roof holds for all houses. This use of the concept is 
concerned universally with all, then. But a particular use is 
concerned only with many. E.g., some houses must have a 
gate. Or I use the concept only for an individual thing. 
E.g., this house is plastered in this way or that. 
 
Consequently, it is judgments, not concepts, that are divided 
into universal, particular, and singular, as only judgments can 
specify the use of concepts based on their quantitative deter-
minations.  
In an epistemic context, taking up the singular judgments 
used by Kant (employed singularly as a subject of a judgment 
so as to represent a given object and ascribe it a certain 
property), a concept must fulfil two conditions: the condition of 
existence, according to which the concept must represent an 
existing object in a space-time dimension which can be met 
only through the intervention of intuition, and the condition of 
uniqueness, whereby the concept must represent an object 
through the specific features that only that particular object 
possesses. These conditions further articulate the issue of 
identification, whereby the same intuition – that is, the same 
phenomenal object – can be identified on several occasions 
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only with respect to a conceptual dimension under which the 
intuition falls (see Thompson, 1972). 
At first glance, here the emerging picture is descriptivist. In 
view of the fact that it relates to its object in an immediate way, 
i.e., without the mediation of any conceptual content, the 
intuition is a demonstrative singular representation; nonetheless, 
while the intuitive dimension can only attest to the presence of 
something spatio-temporally located, it cannot identify nor re-
identify it as the same particular object. To take a trivial 
example, if proper names are the linguistic labels of intuitions, 
then we cannot apply nor reapply the same name to a specific 
individual: «Names can be applied, reapplied, and misapplied; 
so can concepts, but not intuitions» (Thompson 1972, 91). 
Mutatis mutandis, the same argument can be used with regard 
to demonstratives; as Kant probably concurred with the Port 
Royalists’ claim that the pronoun “this” is equivalent to “this 
thing”, the demonstrative simply makes a concept (even the 
most general of all) singular. Despite the remarkable differences 
between names and demonstratives highlighted by Capozzi 
(2014)7, in Kant the use of singular terms seems essentially 
bound to the conceptual component; the intuitive dimension 
alone cannot even identify something spatio-temporally located 
as an object, as will be discussed in the next sections. 
                                                            
7 Capozzi (2014): «there is a difference between the singularization of “house” and the 
singular “Julius Caesar,” a difference that is disregarded in Thompson’s interpretation. As we 
have seen, “this house” preserves the logical essence of the general concept “house” and 
indicates a point in the class-extension of the concept “house” and of no other concept. 
“Julius Caesar” conveys a conceptual content, but this content differs from the logical 
essence of general concepts. A singular concept does not contain a complex of few, 
primitive, immutable, necessary and unchangeable marks that are associated to the name and 
are available to anyone. A singular concept contains a single obligatory mark – the thought of 
something singular – which can be complemented with variable aggregates of conceptual 
marks with a freedom impossible for “house”». 
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4. Knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by 
description: the weak conceptualist view 
 
rom the semantic considerations on the referential 
mechanism of the intuitive representations expounded in 
the preceding paragraph to a more strictly epistemic 
perspective, as to the distinction between conceptual and non-
conceptual content, the Kantian difference between concepts 
and intuitions has been partially related to the distinction 
between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by de-
scription, which specifies two basic types of knowledge (cf. 
Hanna 2008, 52)8. 
While descriptive representations represent their referents 
through the properties they instantiate – their reference being 
determined by the existence of whatever may satisfy such a 
property – in the so-called de re thoughts the individual or the 
object to which the thought refers is determined by a de-
monstrative mode of presentation specified by a relation of 
information-perception between the object and the occurrence 
of the thought. In a nutshell, non-descriptive representations 
represent their referents through a contextual relation between 
the occurrence of a thought and the object itself9  (against this 
                                                            
8 Since Russell onward, much has been written on the subject; for our purposes, and taking 
account of the current debate between descriptivism and singularism involving both 
philosophies of language and mind (cf. Jeshion 2010), the intuitive difference between 
descriptive thoughts, which relate to a particular object or individual (e.g., “the strongest man 
in the world can lift 150 kg”), and the so-called de re thoughts (e.g., “that man is drunk”), 
based on a relation of acquaintance, can be immediately grasped by highlighting the nature 
and the different roles of the respective modes of presentation (see Burge, 1977; Bach, 1987; 
Recanati, 2009). In particular, de re thoughts are based on the reconsideration of Russell’s 
notion of acquaintance through Evans’s neo-Fregean lesson, which explicitly takes into 
account non-descriptive modes of presentation. 
9 This implies that the determination of the reference does not depend on an inherent 
representational criterion – in other words, it is not based on the fact that the representation 
conforms to the object to which it refers – but on a rather external one: a perceptual relation 
between the representation and its object, which, as such, is not represented in the content of 
the representation itself. Expressed in a different way, what in de re thoughts makes an object 
the referent of the thought is not the fact that the object satisfies any one of the properties 
expressed by a concept. Obviously, properties may also come into the picture, as the property 
F 
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background, non-descriptive representations are token-reflexive 
due to their indexical nature; therefore, they have two semantic 
levels). 
In Kant we can find an articulation of the different types of 
cognition that calls to mind a specific difference between 
propositional knowledge (erkennen dass) and knowledge by 
acquaintance (kennen) (cf. de Sá Pereira 2013). Following the 
Jäsche Logik (cf. also Blomberg Logic, § 139): 
 
The first degree of cognition is: to represent something; 
The second: to represent something with consciousness, 
or to perceive (percipere); 
The third: to be acquainted with [kennen] something 
(noscere), or to represent something in comparison with 
other things, both as to sameness [Einerleiheit] and as to 
difference; 
The fourth: to be acquainted with [kennen] something 
with consciousness, i.e., to cognize it [erkennen]; 
(cognoscere). Animals are acquainted with [kennen] 
objects too, but they do not cognize [erkennen] them. 
(Log, 569-570) 
 
The classic Kantian example of the savage used by Hanna 
(2006, 104) to explain one of the Kantian non-conceptual con-
tent types seems to fall under the types of de re thoughts: 
 
If a savage (Wilder) sees a house from a distance for 
example, with whose use he is not acquainted, he 
admittedly has before him in his representation the very 
                                                                                                                                       
of being drunk in the de re thought exemplified by “that man is drunk”; nonetheless, the 
referent – i.e., the man endowed with the property of being drunk – is not so much 
determined by the properties instantiated as through the direct mode of presentation by virtue 
of a relation of acquaintance which is not represented as such. In de re thoughts, properties 
play no role in determining what a non-descriptive representation refers to, so much so that I 
can correctly refer to the man to whom I attribute the property of being drunk even if I 
actually see that the man is not drunk at all: what matters is the particular perceptual relation 
established between the object and the mental occurrence. 
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same object as someone else who is acquainted with it 
determinately as a dwelling established for humans. But 
as to form, this cognition of one and the same object is 
different in the two. With one it is mere intuition, with the 
other it is intuition and concept at the same time. (Log, 
544-5) 
  
As opposed to a more “urbanized” subject, the savage 
neither possesses the concept of “house” nor recognizes that 
particular object as such; however, he does possess an intuitive 
presentation that establishes an immediate, singular represent-
ational link with the object in question10. 
 
4.1 The theory of the transcendental object  
  
oncerning the issues at the heart of the debate between 
conceptualists and non-conceptualists summarized 
above, this paragraph will deal with certain aspects of 
the so-called theory of the transcendental object. This theory 
has important repercussions because it apparently denies that 
intuition may be provided with an autonomous function of de re 
presentation. The condition of possibility for intuition to 
apprehend a phenomenal object is based on an act of thinking 
of the intellect involving the concept of the transcendental 
object (Allison 1968).  
According to the well-known distinction between noumenon 
and phenomenon11, the object o has an existence in itself and is 
                                                            
10 This particular case involves two different types of knowledge. Animals, as well as the 
savage in the example, have the kennen – i.e., they represent what they experience – and can 
distinguish an object from another thanks to the different types of sensations behind the 
material dimension of the intuition. On the other hand, they are not able to gain knowledge 
and awareness, i.e., they do not possess the erkennen, as no concept is involved. 
11 As is well known, also following Prauss (1974) and Allison (2004) – just to mention two 
classical works within the huge Kantian debate – there are important distinctions to be made 
(fortunately, for our purposes we can refrain from taking position on the correct interpretation 
of Transcendental Idealism). On the one hand, Kant introduces Ding an sich (and its variants, 
i.e., Sache, Gegenstand, and Object an sich) as a short phrase for Ding an sich selbst (and its 
variants, i.e., Sache, Gegenstand, and Object an sich selbst) and, especially, for Ding an sich 
C 
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presented as a phenomenon through intuition i. Provided that it 
is not possible to know an object in itself and assign it certain 
properties outside the representational order, to think an object 
in itself it is necessary the employment of the indeterminate 
thought that something in general (= x) exists in itself and 
appears through the intuition (KrV A 104). The concept of an 
object in general is nothing but the concept of a transcendental 
object. Intuitions are sensible singular representations that 
immediately refer to objects, whereas appearances – i.e., the 
products of this relation – are representations to be kept distinct 
from what is referred to as “transcendental object” (= x). 
Considered in its function, the concept of a general or 
transcendental object (= x) is the indeterminate thought of a 
single object having an existence in itself. It consists in the 
condition of possibility to think the singular object – spatio-
temporally determined by the intuition as Erscheinung – and 
provide it with objective reality through the consequent 
unification of empirical concepts and the relative attribution of 
the properties presented by the intuition:  
 
we are now also able to determine our concepts of an 
object in general more correctly. All representations, as 
representations, have their object, and can themselves be 
objects of other representations in turn. Appearances are 
the only objects that can be given to us immediately, and 
that in them which is immediately related to the object is 
called intuition. However, these appearances are not 
things in themselves, but themselves only representations, 
which in turn have their object, which therefore cannot be 
further intuited by us, and that may therefore be called the 
non-empirical, i.e., transcendental object = X. The pure 
                                                                                                                                       
selbst betrachtet. On first approximation, if it is possible to distinguish between Erscheinung, 
the indeterminate object of sensible intuition, and Phänomenon, the sensible object falling 
under the categories, then it should also be possible to identify a further distinction between 
Ding an sich and Noumenon: «The former is conceptually undetermined, since our thought 
of it is empty of real content, while the latter, as putative object of an intellectual intuition, is 
“conceptually” determined, though not for our discursive intellect» (Allison 2004, 58). 
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concept of this transcendental object (which in all of our 
cognitions is really always one and the same = X) is that 
which in all of our empirical concepts in general can 
provide relation to an object, i.e., objective reality. This 
concept cannot contain any determinate intuition at all, 
and therefore concerns nothing but that unity which must 
be encountered in a manifold of cognition insofar as it 
stands in relation to an object. (KrV A108/109) 
 
Leaving aside the many exegetical and theoretical problems 
addressed by the debate on the relation between transcendental 
object, noumenon, and the thing in itself12, and on the 
terminological change introduced in the second edition of the 
KrV as regards the distinction between a positive and a negative 
sense of noumenon – which is not supposed to affect the gist of 
the theory, despite Kant’s dismissal of the expression 
“transcendental object” – for Allison (2004, 61) the concept of 
the transcendental object should be considered as a sort of 
transcendental pointer: «it serves to define the philosophical 
task by indicating that the commonsensical and transcend-
dentally realistic concern with the “real” nature of objects must 
be replaced by a critical analysis of the conditions of the 
representation of an object». At this stage it might be useful to 
refer to the intensional logic apparatus employed by Howell to 
                                                            
12 In several passages Kant sharply distinguishes the noumenon from the transcendental 
object, for example KrV A 253: «The object to which I relate appearance in general is the 
transcendental object, i.e., the entirely undetermined thought of something in general. This 
cannot be called the noumenon; for I do not know anything about what it is in itself, and have 
no concept of it except merely that of the object of a sensible intuition in general, which is 
therefore the same for all appearances». In KrV A288-89/B344-45 Kant suggests that the 
transcendental object might also be considered as a noumenon only if it is correctly 
understood. Even if there are certain KrV passages where Kant relates the transcendental 
object to the thing as it is in itself, for Allison (2004, 60) the concept of the transcendental 
object is introduced in order to deal with the issue of the “immanentization” of cognition: 
«The basic problem is that we cannot, as it were, stand outside our representations in order to 
compare them with some transcendentally real entity. Accordingly, such an object “must be 
thought only as something in general = X” (A104), which is later identified with the 
transcendental object». 
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articulate the theory of the transcendental object, starting from a 
slight adaptation of one of his examples. 
Suppose that a subject H has a cognitive relation with a 
triangular wooden house: empirical intuition i displays the 
different properties contained in the manifold of represent-
ations, e.g., i1 displays property P1 of being made of wood, i2 
displays property P2 of being a house, i3 displays spatial part s1, 
corresponding to the upper part of the house positioned in l1, 
and, lastly, i4 displays spatial part s2, corresponding to the lower 
part of the house positioned in l2. The manifold is synthesised in 
the intuition by the imagination and the application of concepts 
so that the intuitive singular representation falling under the 
empirical concept “triangular wooden house” displays 
proprieties and spatial parts jointly (C being the concept of 
“wooden house”, D being the concept of “being triangular”). 
Given that the conditions of possibility of (1) H knows that 
(object o is made of wood) presuppose (2) H thinks that (object 
o has the property of being made of wood), the example can be 
articulated as follows: 
 
(3) i1 displays P1 to H & then i2 displays P2 to H & then i3 
displays s1 (as occurring at l1) to H & then i4 displays s2 (as 
occurring at l2) to H & H thinks that [some single object X 
is such that (X has P1 & X has P2 & X has s1 & X has s2 & 
s1 occurs at l1 & s2 occurs at l2 & X occurs at l1 + l2 & P1 
and P2 jointly constitute concept C & s1 and s2 jointly 
specify concept D)]. 
 
In sum, what is at play here is an intensional context 
allowing no substitution of co-referential singular terms. As is 
well known, with Quine (1956) – who expressly speaks of the 
relational and notional sense of those attitude verbs such as 
“believe” – a sentence containing an intensional operator can be 
ambiguous as regards a de re or a de dicto interpretation. 
However, this can be immediately grasped as soon as the scope 
of the existential quantifier is ascertained: using the same 
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example in a synthetic way, (5) H thinks that (some single 
object X is such and such) presents a de re and a de dicto 
reading, respectively, (5a) (∃ x)[x has existence in itself & x is an 
object & H thinks that (x is an object & x is such and such)]; 
(5b) H thinks that (∃ x) (x is an object & x is such and such). 
The de dicto reading captures the peculiar features assigned by 
Kant to the concept of a general or transcendental object (= X): 
specifically, this takes on the role of an indeterminate thought, 
which, in turn, although referring to a single object (= X), 
relates to no object in particular: 
 
[H’s de dicto thought] is in fact an indeterminate thought, 
a thought about an object in general, and a thought 
nevertheless not about a special type or kind of object, just 
in the following sense: namely, just in the sense that in this 
thought H thinks that there is an object x, in the most 
general sense of ‘object’, which is such and such; but in 
this thought H does not think, de re fashion, of any 
particular object (or type or kind of object), that that object 
is such and such. It does seem to be in just this sense that 
Kant means us to understand the sort of indeterminacy 
that, according to the transcendental-object theory, is 
supposed to attach to H’s act of thought. (Howell 1981, 
102) 
 
The de dicto reading of (3) produces (6): 
 
(6) i1 displays P1 to H & then i2 displays P2 to H & then i3 
displays s1 (as occurring at l1) to H & then i4 displays s2 (as 
occurring at l2) to H & H thinks that (∃ x) (X is an object & 
X has P1 & X has P2 & X has s1 & X has s2 & s1 occurs at 
l1 & s2 occurs at l2 & X occurs at l1 + l2 & P1 and P2 jointly 
constitute concept C & s1 and s2 jointly specify concept D) 
 
In this Kantian scenario, the typically de re knowledge of a 
single particular object – e.g., of a subject perceiving a triang-
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ular wooden house before her – is a de dicto act of thought. On 
the basis of a de re mechanism, a phenomenal object is 
identified by the presentation function performed by the 
indexical empirical intuition locating the object in a given 
position within the spatio-temporal forms of sensibility. 
Through a de dicto mechanism, the relative concept of a trans-
cendental object is involved as a condition of possibility in 
order to think an object; the attestation of singularity of a spatio-
temporal something by intuition can be thus represented as an 
object which is attributed certain properties thanks to the 
synthesis of the empirical concepts. 
The concept of the transcendental object is therefore a 
pointer, although conceptual rather than relational by definition. 
As to the above remarks on the difference between descriptive 
and non-descriptive representations, if the intuition presents a 
non-descriptive relational mode of presentation, and if such a 
relation is not displayed in the representation’s content, in order 
to represent the object presented by the intuition as an object, 
then it is necessary the employment of the thought of such a 
relation and represent it a priori as its very condition of 
possibility: «We find, however, that our thought of the relation 
of all cognition to its object carries something of necessity with 
it» (KrV A 104). 
 
4.2. Non-conceptualism vs. weak conceptualism  
 
y interpretative reading based on the theory of the 
transcendental object, that might be referred to as 
weak conceptualism13, features a number of con-
                                                            
13 The Kant’s conceptualism follows directly from the togetherness principle and can be 
divided in (1) a strong Kantian conceptualism: the innate conceptual human capacities not 
only strictly determine all conscious objective representational content but also strictly 
determine the faculty of sensibility itself and all the intuitions (cf., e.g., Sellars 1963, Sellars 
1968, McDowell 1994, Abela 2002); and in (2) a weak Kantian conceptualism: the innate 
conceptual human capacities strictly determine all conscious objective representational 
content, although the faculty of sensibility independently provides a necessary condition for 
conscious objective representation (cf., e.g., Ginsborg 2006, Ginsborg 2008, Grüne 2009, 
M 
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trasting results with the main points stirring the debate on 
Kantian non-conceptualism. The non-conceptualists’ overall 
aim consists in delimiting the conceptualists’ claims behind the 
argumentative structure of the Transcendental Deduction. This 
includes some of the arguments discussed in the previous 
paragraphs through a deflationary strategy aimed at weakening 
the togetherness principle. As already observed, the involve-
ment of the faculty of judgment is allegedly necessary only as 
to objective knowledge, not perception: in fact, perception is 
assumed to lie on the use of intuitive representations without the 
intervention of concepts understood as general rules constitu-
ting judgments (cf. Hanna 2006; Allais 2009). 
The Kantian non-conceptualist strategy has several further 
ramifications. In particular, 1) it refers to those passages from 
the Transcendental Deduction (KrV A89/B122, B 132, B145) 
holding that no intervention of the intellect is needed to ensure 
that phenomenal objects are given in the intuition14; 2) it 
distinguishes figurative from intellectual synthesis; 3) it asserts 
that the intuition can be based on a non-conceptual activity of 
synthesis.  
For example, Allais (2009) draws attention to the passages 
focusing on the threefold synthesis in the first edition of the 
Transcendental Deduction: unlike apprehension and  repro-
duction, here only recognition involves the conceptual 
dimension. Secondly, Allais refers to KrV A78/B103, where a 
distinction between the imagination’s synthesis and the 
functions of the intellect is made. In this way, Allais (2009) 
argues for the attribution of the relative non-conceptual content 
                                                                                                                                       
Land 2011, Griffith 2012, Williams 2012). For Hanna (2014), «the weak variety at least 
minimally preserves Kant’s cognitive dualism of faculties, and also some sort of semi-
independent cognitive role for intuitions (even though it still rejects the thesis that intuitions 
have an essentially different kind of representational content from concepts), the strong 
variety does not countenance any of these concessions to non-conceptualism, and thereby, in 
effect, strong Kantian conceptualism explanatorily reduces the faculty of sensibility to the 
faculty of understanding». 
14 Cf. Hanna (2001, 199) (2005, 259), Allais (2009, 396), Schulting (2012, 84); however, cf. 
the antithetical conceptualist interpretations of KrV A89/B122 by Allison (2001, 38), Grüne 
(2011). 
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to Kant by rejecting a strong conceptualist approach in the 
manner of McDowell – the view for which the intuition does 
not make an even notionally separable contribution to cog-
nition15. To the scholar (2009, 386), the intuition can be 
assumed to provide a separate, perceptual presentation of 
spatio-temporally located mind-independent entities, be they 
objects or empirical details, making an at least notionally 
separable representational contribution. Accordingly, a subject 
can have a perceptual representation with a content without 
possessing any concept to describe that content: 
 
While […] what perceptual states a subject might be in 
does not depend on what concepts she possesses, this need 
not mean denying that our perceptual states are brought 
under concepts, and that experience, for us, typically is an 
actualization of conceptual capacities in sensory cons-
ciousness itself. Rather, what is denied is that experience 
is representational only to the extent that it is brought 
under concepts. Applying this to Kant, the idea is not that 
we need deny that our intuitions are brought under 
concepts (and must be, if we are to cognize an objective 
world), but that they need to be brought under concepts in 
order to present us with particulars. 
 
As said above, this interpretative scenario is essentially based 
on a distinction between the imagination’s synthesis and the 
functions of the intellect; the matter of the different inter-
pretations of the passages suggested in the debate will not be 
                                                            
15 McDowell (1994, 9): «The original Kantian thought was that empirical knowledge results 
from a cooperation between receptivity and spontaneity. […] We can dismount from the 
seesaw if we can achieve a firm grip on this thought: receptivity does not make an even 
notionally separable contribution to the cooperation. The relevant conceptual capacities are 
drawn on in receptivity. […] It is not that they are exercised on an extra-conceptual 
deliverance of receptivity. We should understand what Kant calls “intuition” - experiential 
intake - not as a bare getting of an extra-conceptual Given, but as a kind of occurrence or state 
that already has conceptual content». As pointed up by Allais, even if McDowell's  intention 
in Mind and World is theoretical rather than historical-interpretative, his reading has largely 
influenced the Kantian debate. 
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touched on here16. The passages discussed above, which make 
up the so-called “transcendental object theory”, certainly 
suggest new reflection points to be addressed by those scholars 
who aim to tackle Kantian non-conceptualism. It is one thing to 
establish that the intuitive representation makes a peculiar and 
autonomous (as to conceptual forms) contribution to content, 
and quite another thing to maintain that this contribution may 
enable an object to be perceived regardless of any conceptual 
articulation through an autonomous epistemic function of de re 
presentation assigned to the intuitions. For this reason, my 
perspective might be referred to as weak conceptualism: as 
contrasted with McDowell’s strong conceptualism, here the 
intuition makes a notionally separable representational contri-
bution to cognition, and does so by making reference possible 
in the first place (cf. supra, §§ 2-3). In contrast with Allais’s 
non-conceptualism, this epistemic contribution cannot be 
realized without at least the concept of the transcendental 
object.  
 
4.3 «The object must be thought of only as 
something in general = X» 
 
o delve even deeper into this view it is necessary to 
consider the expression “an object of representations” 
(cf. KrV A 104). Appearances are nothing but sensible 
representations; they are not to be regarded as objects in 
themselves, outside the power of representation. Hence, the 
object has to be considered as distinct from cognition: «this 
object must be thought of only as something in general = X, 
since outside of our cognition we have nothing that we could set 
over against this cognition as corresponding to it».  
                                                            
16 Several commentators (see, e.g., Ginsborg, 2008; Schulting, 2012) have rejected this non-
conceptualist reading by highlighting the passages where the synthetic activity is attributed to 
the intellect (e.g., KrV B129) and the spontaneity of the imagination paralleled to that of the 
intellect (e.g., KrV B162n). 
T 
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The subject cannot be representationally (or perceptually) 
presented with a particular/object if she does not employ the 
concept of the transcendental object understood as a thought on 
the relation between object and cognition. Since «our thought of 
the relation of all cognition to its object carries something of 
necessity with it» then this concept is a necessary condition to 
determine a de re link with an object in the spatio-temporal 
indexical intuitive device. It is worthwhile to quote the full 
passage KrV A 104/105: 
 
What does one mean, then, if one speaks of an object 
corresponding to and therefore also distinct from the 
cognition? It is easy to see that this object must be thought 
of only as something in general = X, since outside of our 
cognition we have nothing that we could set over against 
this cognition as corresponding to it. We find, however, 
that our thought of the relation of all cognition to its object 
carries something of necessity with it, since namely the 
latter is regarded as that which is opposed to our 
cognitions being determined at pleasure or arbitrarily 
rather than being determined a priori, since insofar as they 
are to relate to an object our cognitions must also 
necessarily agree with each other in relation to it, i.e., they 
must have that unity that constitutes the concept of an 
object. 
 
If so, perception seems to be no mere intuitive event. For 
Allais (2009, 386), a subject can perceptually represent those 
particular aspects of things that can be brought under concepts 
even if she does not possess the relevant concepts, e.g. a subject 
can perceive a round red particular without the concepts of 
roundness, redness, and particularity. On the contrary, in my 
view the non-conceptual intuitive content is not assumed to 
exist without at least one transcendental conceptual dimension 
through a de dicto act and its relative concept of a trans-
cendental object. The subject can perceive a round, red 
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particular without the concepts of roundness, redness, and 
particularity, but cannot ascribe them to an object regardless of 
the employment of the concept of the transcendental object: 
«The pure concept of this transcendental object (which in all of 
our cognitions is really always one and the same = X)  is that 
which in all of our empirical concepts in general can provide 
relation to an object, i.e., objective reality» (KrV A 109).  
In KrV A 250, Kant seems to be even more explicit about 
such a descriptivist result. On the one hand, all representations 
are related to some object through the understanding; since 
appearances are nothing but representations, the understanding 
relates them to the object of sensible intuition, i.e. the 
transcendental object: «This signifies, however a something = 
X,  of which we know nothing at all nor can know anything in 
general (in accordance with the current constitution of our 
understanding), but is rather something that can serve only as a 
correlate of the unity of apperception for the unity of the 
manifold in sensible intuition, by means of which the under-
standing unifies that in the concept of an object». On the other 
hand, and this is the point at issue, «this transcendental object 
cannot even be separated from the sensible data, for then 
nothing would remain through which it would be thought». Yet, 
as it is no object of cognition in itself, the transcendental object 
is «only the representation of appearances under the concept of 
an object in general, which is determinable through the 
manifold of those appearances». It follows that the very 
appearances cannot subsist without the employment of the 
representation or concept of an object in general, so much so 
that the categories do not represent any special object given to 
the understanding, «but rather serve only to determine the 
transcendental object (the concept of something in general) 
through that which is given in sensibility, in order thereby to 
cognize appearances empirically under concepts of objects». 
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5. Conclusion 
 
t thus seems that the subject can be perceptually presented 
with a particular/object regardless of the application of 
empirical concepts ‒ and probably of pure concepts too ‒ 
provided that the non-conceptual content theorists’ arguments 
on the Transcendental Deduction are accurate (cf. supra, n. 12); 
in any event, this cannot possibly be the case without at least the 
concept of the transcendental object.  
To return to the example of the savage perceiving a house, 
the savage and an urbanized subject will share the same type of 
intuitive representation and yet not the same conceptual 
dimension from a strictly empirical standpoint: both must 
employ the concept of the transcendental object – i.e. the 
concept of an object in general – as a condition of possibility for 
«the representation of appearances». Following this, the object 
is likely to be attributed a number of specific proprieties in the 
form of a judgment through the synthesis of the manifold, 
provided that the relevant empirical concepts are available.  
In conclusion, the concept of a transcendental object allows 
the thought of the phenomenal object presented by the intuition 
in a non-descriptive mode at a spatio-temporal level. Hence, the 
Kantian de re proposal appears to be essentially descriptivist. 
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